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Abstract
War, whether external or internal, large or small, is a costly endeavor. Loss of life, loss of
close friends or family, and the destruction of material possessions all play a part in the costs
of war. The purpose of this paper is to capture only the material, economic welfare costs of
conflict stemming from the altered path of consumption resulting from conflict. As such, the
measure is quite a lower bound for the true and more encompassing welfare loss from living
in a non-peaceful world. But how much would individual be willing to pay to avoid just the
economic costs of conflict? Remarkably, even these pure economic welfare losses from
conflict are quite large. I find that, on average, individuals who live in a country that has
experienced some conflict during the 1960-1992 sample would permanently give up to
approximately 8 percent of their current level of consumption to live in a purely peaceful
world. Such large potential welfare gains from reducing warfare should make economists and
policy-makers take note, and continue to investigate and advocate for domestic and
international institutions to realize such gains.
JEL Classification: E21, E32, H56.
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of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Federal Reserve System, or the IMF.... when the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will not
suﬃce.
The Art of War, Sun-Tzu (1963) p.73.
Mankind does have the capacity, over time, to correlate the costs and beneﬁts of univer-
sal undertakings. Throughout much of the time for which we have a record of human
behaviour, mankind can clearly be seen to have judged that war’s beneﬁts outweighed its
costs, or appeared to do so when a putative balance was struck. Now the computation
works in the opposite direction. Costs clearly exceed beneﬁts.
A History of Warfare, John Keegan (1993) p. 59.
War may sometimes be a necessary evil. But no matter how necessary, it is always an
evil, never a good. Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, Jimmy Carter (2002).
1 Introduction
Conﬂict can have many deleterious eﬀects on the well-being of individuals. First, there is the
destruction and loss of life that directly results from war. Turmoil also leads to decreased and
uncertain supplies of necessities as the means of production are redirected from consumer goods to
those necessary for the war eﬀort. Emotional pain and suﬀering, forced conscription, in addition
to the very real possibility of death, although diﬃcult to quantify, add signiﬁcantly to the cost of
conﬂict. Keegan (1993) remarks that:
Some of these costs [of war] are material. The superinﬂationary expense of weapon
procurement distorts the budgets even of the richest states, while the poor states deny
themselves the chance of economic emancipation when they seek to make themselves
militarily formidable. The human costs of actually going to war are even higher. Rich
states, as between themselves, recognise that they are not to be borne. Poor states
which fall into war with rich states are overwhelmed and humiliated. Poor states ﬁght
with each other, or are drawn into civil war, destroy their own well-being, and even
the structures which make recovery from the experience of war possible. War truly has
become a scourge, as was disease through most of human history. Keegan (1993) p. 59.
Many other authors have also suggested that the 20th century has brought forth changes in terms
of regime as well as technological change in mass destruction such that no nation can be expected
1to gain economically from conﬂict–e.g., Howard (1983, p. 22), Pigou (1940, pp. 21-22), Robbins
(1942, pp. 68 and 71) and Wright (1965, pp. 242 and 1367).1 Needless to say, war provides no
reasonably expected prospects for economic or personal betterment for ordinary citizens.2
Of course, this opens up the question of why we observe conﬂict despite it making rep-
resentative individuals worse oﬀ? These issues are broadly discussed in Hess and Orphanides
[1995,2001a,b]. Simply put, while citizens are not expected to gain by war, it is leaders that choose
to enter wars, not citizens. In particular, in Hess and Orphanides [2001b], we argue that non-
democratic leaders engage in potentially beneﬁcial appropriative conﬂict through their ability to
enjoy the beneﬁts from conﬂict while leaving their citizenry to face the costs of conﬂict. In contrast,
while democratically elected leaders are not able to avoid the potential costs from war that the
citizenry are faced with, they are further motivated by the desire to hold oﬃce and enjoy any oﬃce
speciﬁc rents. Indeed, in Hess and Orphanides [1995,2001a,2001b] we demonstrate how such “wag
the dog” motives for war can be sustained by rational voters.3
In this paper, I provide a lower bound estimate for the welfare costs of conﬂict by exploring
only the forgone consumption from being mired in a world of conﬂict. Following the approach by
Lucas (1987), I demonstrate how one can theoretically “price” the eﬀect that war has on consump-
tion’s growth and volatility. Intuitively, these consumption growth costs from war would be avoided
in a perpetually peaceful world, which allows us to calculate the equivalent variation of how much
individuals would be willing to give up in order to live in a peaceful world.
It is worth noting that implicit in the methodology is the assumption that obviating conﬂict
is possible. Further, the peaceful world I consider removes the eﬀect of war from all participants.
That is the cost estimates that I provide are not those from choosing a peaceful path when others
have not (i.e., the costs of “turning the other cheek”). Rather, the cost estimates are an individual
1Mueller (1989) goes so far as to say that major war between modernized countries is not only unproﬁtable but
heading towards extinction. Indeed, he conjectures that it will follow the progression of dueling and slavery: from
objectionable, to unfashionable, and then ﬁnally to unthinkable. Howard (2000) takes a less sanguine perspective:
”So although it is tempting to believe that as the international bourgeois community extends its inﬂuence a new and
stable world order will gradually come into being, we would be unwise to expect anything of the kind [p. 113].”
2See Lau, Poutvaara and Wagener (2002) and Nordhaus (2002) for recent studies that examine particular facets
of the cost of conﬂict. In particular, the former study examines the cost of the draft while the latter explores the
government spending costs to the U.S. of a potential conﬂict with Iraq.
3See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (1996) for a deeper consideration of the economic appropriative motive for conﬂict.
2country’s net economic beneﬁt from a peaceful world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present a theoretical
measure for estimating the economic welfare costs of conﬂict. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data
sources and compute the empirical magnitudes of the welfare costs of conﬂict, respectively. I
conclude in Section 5.
2 Theory
To construct the lower bound estimate of the cost of conﬂict, I adopt a technique ﬁrst suggested by
Lucas (1987) to estimate the potential gains from removing business cycles.4 Lucas’ approach asks
us to consider two consumption paths–the path where there is some positive probability of entering
into adverse or beneﬁcial states and a synthetic path where the probabilities of entering into such
states are zero. Since Lucas is only concerned with business cycle eﬀects, he does not allow the
average rate of consumption growth to diﬀer between these two welfare paths.5 By equating the
two consumption paths, one can “price” the amount an individual would be willing to give up on
an annual basis to attain the latter path–i.e., it’s equivalent variation. Lucas’ insight hinges on the
observation that the average person (or representative agent) would be willing to permanently
give up to some portion of their current consumption to reduce or eliminate the uncertainty or
variance of consumption over their lifetime.
Formally, begin with a representative individual who lives in country i with lifetime utility
described by the following equation:6
4Using U.S. data from the post-war period, Lucas estimated that the certainty equivalent of completely eliminating
the business cycle was trivial—averaging less than one-tenth of one percent of consumption growth. Further, an
increase of this magnitude was only for a relatively large coeﬃcient of risk aversion (ρ = 10). This type of measure
has also been used in other contexts. For example, it can also be used to gauge the welfare costs of international risk
sharing–see van Wincoop (1994) and Crucini and Hess (2000).
5Lucas (1987) also considers the case where the mean growth rate of consumption is allowed to change, though
in calculations separate from those that measure the costs of business cycles. More generally, this approach can be
used to price the eﬀects from removing other events such as terrorism, earthquakes, ﬂoods, etc...
6Importantly, the analysis departs from Lucas’ method in the following critical way: while Lucas models the log
level of consumption as being subject to i.i.d. shocks around a constant trend, I adopt the more appealing speciﬁcation
of the log of consumption being subject to i.i.d. shocks around a stochastic trend. This has a number of beneﬁts.
First, it is wildly more consistent speciﬁcation of the data – see the Supplemental Appendix. Second, a random walk
speciﬁcation is consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which again has broad support in the data. Third,
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Assuming that the following holds for all i countries,















Instead of a world without consumption uncertainty, as Lucas (1987) proposed for his
measure of the welfare costs of business cycles, in this exercise I compare the expected welfare
from each country remaining in its realized path of consumption, to another synthetic path of
consumption where there is no state of war. In the two diﬀerent consumption paths we have the
observed world, where there is some observed probability of entering into a state of war, as well as
the path where the eﬀects of war are eliminated, denoted with ∗.7
329-32).
7In neoclassical growth models, shocks, such as war, that aﬀect the return on investment have short-run eﬀects
on the growth rate and the level of output but do not aﬀect the steady-state rate of growth in the economy. En-
dogenous growth models allow distortionary taxes and (un)productive expenditure to aﬀect the steady state growth
rate. Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001) ﬁnd evidence that strongly supports endogenous growth models. In
particular, they ﬁnd that when ﬁnanced by a mixture of non-productive expenditures and and non-distortionary
taxation, productive expenditures raise and distortionary taxes lower the growth rate. Also see Quah (1997) for a
broader perspective on shortcomings of exogenous growth models. Moreover, the relationship between output and
consumption will be aﬀected by conﬂict, and it is the latter that is required in measuring welfare. Indeed, Braun
and McGrattan (1993) argue that “output rises and private investment and consumption are crowded out” (p. 198)
4Some might question the validity of this counter-factual, that is, whether it is indeed possible
to avoid conﬂict in all cases? Or, whether the ultimate cost of anticipating and preventing conﬂict
is higher than the costs of engaging in war?8 While acknowledging these points, I believe that the
essential question is meritorious: namely, what is the direct economic welfare loss from conﬂict?
For even if current dispute resolution methods and institutions cannot avert all conﬂicts, pointing
out the potential beneﬁts may lead to the development of new institutions, or better enforcement
and adherence to peaceful resolution, which can in turn lead some countries away from violence.
By calculating this cost, I reveal the absolute minimum that people would be willing to pay in
order to enjoy the economic beneﬁts from peace.
For the time being let’s put aside for now the estimation issues involved in creating a
synthetic path of “peaceful” consumption. From a theoretical standpoint, however, both the average
rate of consumption growth and the variance of consumption may diﬀer in these two scenarios. For
example, the growth rate of consumption could fall during (or after) war because a country’s
economic infrastructure has been damaged. In addition, economic volatility could rise during a
war, as the fortunes of the various warring countries ebb and ﬂow. To keep matters simple, denote




Formally, to “price” the amount that a representative household in each country would pay
in order to obtain the peaceful path of consumption, we return to Lucas’ methodology. In other
words, I now solve for the amount of current consumption, τ∗
i , that equates the expected welfare
of remaining on the current path of consumption to one where consumption is devoid of conﬂict,
namely: "




















The solution for τi, assuming that Ci = C∗
i , is the following:9
during both World Wars for both the U.S. and U.K. See also McGrattan and Ohanian (1999).
8See Kaysen’s (1990) review of Mueller (1989) for an insightful discussion of this point.
9Making the assumption that Ci = C∗
i again places a lower bound on the welfare beneﬁts from removing conﬂict
from the world. In all likelihood, any reduction in military spending that follows from increased peace should lead to









Again, τi is the fraction of current consumption that a representative individual in country
i would be willing to give up on a permanent basis in order to live in a world without conﬂict.
To understand how potentially enhanced consumption growth and reduced consumption volatility



















i + (1 + µi)−1∆µi
i
. (7)
Ceteris paribus, if a more peaceful world can deliver more growth and less volatility, each of these
factors will raise the amount that a representative individual would pay in order to get rid of
conﬂict.
In the following sections, the historical eﬀect of conﬂict on the consumption growth path
are estimated. In practical terms, I provide estimates of the change in each country’s per-capita
consumption growth rate and its variability if it were to move from its current path where wars
occur to a path where they do not. This involves estimating parameters for µi, µ∗
i, σ2
i , and σ2∗
i .
In this way, the value of removing these eﬀects of conﬂict on the expected economic welfare from
consumption can be priced.
It should be clear that what I advocate is a lower bound estimate on the true cost of conﬂict
since many of the costs discussed earlier are not included in this calculation. The costs neglected
are many: loss of life, loss of close personal friends or family, forced conscription, distributional
costs, etc. Rather, by focusing only on the welfare costs of conﬂict stemming from consumption, a
truly lower bound estimate of war’s ultimate harm is obtained.
state level of consumption. For example, recent evidence in Ramey and Shapiro [1998] suggests that in post-war U.S.
data, consumption and manufacturing productivity are negatively aﬀected by exogenous military buildups.
10Although we provide the Taylor approximation in expression (7), all calculations below (Tables 4-6) are done
using the exact solution, expression (6).
63 The Data
This section begins with a description of the data. The economic data are obtained from the
update to the Summers and Heston (1991) data set. To gauge the impact of conﬂict, both internal
and external, on consumption’s empirical moments, three main data sources are used. To measure
internal conﬂict, I use the data set constructed by Gurr and Harﬀ (1997). The external conﬂict
data are from the International Crisis Behavior data set by Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988,
1997) and the updated Correlates of War data by Small and Singer (1982). Both conﬂict data sets
were used to construct the dummy variables for the eight types of conﬂict discussed below.
The data for internal conﬂicts were obtained from the State Failure Data Set compiled by a
research team under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr of the University of Maryland and Barbara
Harﬀ of the U.S. Naval Academy, originally for use by the CIA. The data was originally assembled
in 1994 and updated in 1997. The State Failure data divides internal conﬂict into four categories.
First, ethnic conﬂict (ETHN) is deﬁned as conﬂict between the government and national ethnic,
religious, or other communal minorities seeking changes in their status. In order to be considered a
war, more than 1000 individuals had to be mobilized and 1000 fatalities must have occurred during
a given year. Second, genocide (GENO) includes the promotion, execution, and/or consent of
sustained policies by governing elites or their agents that result in more than 1000 deaths per year
of either a communal group or a politicized non-communal group (politicide). This diﬀers from
ethnic conﬂict in that victims counted are non-combatants. Third, revolution (REVO) is deﬁned
as conﬂict between the government and politically organized groups seeking to overthrow those in
power. Groups include political parties, labor organizations, or parts of the regime itself. Once
again, in order to be considered a war, more than 1000 individuals had to be mobilized and 1000
fatalities must have occurred per year. Finally, regime change (REGM) includes state collapse
and shifts from democratic and authoritarian rule as deﬁned by a shift of at least 3 points on the
Freedom House polity scale. Further, the level of violence associated with the regime change must
at minimum include armed violence in the capital (as in the case of violent coups). This measure
does not include nonviolent transitions.11 In all, ETHN, GENO, REVO and REGM are dummy
11See Collier and Sambanis (2002) and the references therein for a broader description of the economic causes and
consequences of civil wars.
7variables that take the value 1 if an internal conﬂict of that type takes place, and zero otherwise.
The data for external conﬂict were obtained from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB)
project undertaken by Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997),
and includes the initiation or escalation of a conﬂict that warrants the highest level of severity.
Also, from this data set, periods where a conﬂict continues can also be determined. They deﬁne
external conﬂict (EXT), a trigger to a foreign policy crisis, as:
... a speciﬁc act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive
a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of in-
volvement in military hostilities. A trigger may be initiated by: an adversary state; a
non-state actor; or a group of states (military alliance). It may be an environmental
change; or it may be internally generated. Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) [p.
53]
A foreign policy crisis with the highest intensity of violence, “full-scale war,” was deemed a violent
external conﬂict.12
External conﬂicts, both inter- and extra-state wars, that appear in the Correlates of War
database, initiated by Small and Singer (1982), are used to determine whether a conﬂict is large-
scale or big (B). The Correlates of War data is helpful in this regard as these conﬂicts are required
to have at least 1000 military casualties to be included in their data set. External conﬂicts that
are not deemed “big”, are deemed small (S).13 Both types of external conﬂict are disaggregated
using the ICB data into home (H) and away (A) conﬂicts–conﬂicts which occur on the actor’s
home territory, and those that do not, respectively. In all, there are four types of external conﬂict:
external big home (EXTBH), external big away (EXTBA), external small home (EXTSH), and
external small away (EXTSA). Each type of external conﬂict is again coded as a dummy variables
that take the value 1 if an internal conﬂict of that type takes place, and zero otherwise.
Finally, the economic data are from the Summers and Heston data set. I calculated log
per-capita annual consumption growth rates for most countries from 1950 to 1992, although for
12This deﬁnition was similarly adopted in Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2001), Hess and Orphanides (1995,2001a)
and Blomberg and Hess (2002).
13A similar classiﬁcation is used in Hess and Orphanides (2001a) for the United States.
8many countries the data does not begin until 1960. Demographic and descriptive data are taken
from the World Bank’s Social Indicators and Fixed Factors data set as well as various sources
described in Sala-i-Martin (1997) − see Data Appendix.
4 Evidence
In the following sub-sections, I quantify the impact of conﬂict on consumption’s mean growth
and volatility. Sub-section 4.1 provides some summary statistics on conﬂict on a country-by-
country basis. In sub-section 4.2 I quantify the eﬀect that conﬂict has on consumption’s statistical
moments. Finally, in sub-section 4.3 I compute the welfare costs of conﬂict as well as demonstrate
the robustness of these computations to changes in the methods for estimating the eﬀect of conﬂict
on consumption.
4.1 Empirical Regularities
This section begins by examining the average incidence of conﬂict by type. I consider eight diﬀerent
speciﬁcations for conﬂict: large external wars fought on home territory (EXTBH), small exter-
nal wars fought on home territory (EXTSH), large external wars fought away (EXTBA), small
external wars fought away (EXTSA), genocides (GENO), ethnic conﬂicts (ETHN), abrupt and
disruptive regime changes (REGM), and revolutionary wars (REV ). Table 1 reports the fraction
of time that countries (1) engaged in at least one conﬂict and (2) had more than ﬁve observations
on consumption growth spent in diﬀerent types of conﬂict during the sample period (1960-92). The
Data Appendix reports those countries that did not have either internal or external conﬂicts, as
deﬁned by the data sets described above, or for whom there was not consumption data.14 Table 1
raises several questions about the way in which conﬂicts are coded. For example, according to the
table, the former U.S.S.R. did not engage in conﬂicts from 1960 to 1992. In light of recent events,
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-88) immediately springs to mind. The reason behind
14Note that Summers and Heston (1992) data are not available for a number of extremely poor countries such as
Afghanistan. Since many of these countries have been devoured by conﬂict, the omission of these countries is likely
to bias downward even further my admittedly lower bound cost of conﬂict. See the Data Appendix for the omitted
countries.
9Table 1: Fraction (%)of Time Spent in Conﬂict by Type
Country Type of Conﬂicts
Africa EXTBH EXTSH EXTBA EXTSA GENO ETHN REGM REV NOBS
Algeria 3.13 12.50 3.13 3.13 6.25 9.38 32
Angola 3.45 51.72 51.72 51.72 29
Benin 21.88 32
Burundi 31.25 15.63 12.50 32
Chad 6.25 3.13 87.50 21.88 32
Congo 15.63 25.00 21.88 15.63 32
Egypt 9.09 6.06 9.09 33





Mauritania 9.38 6.25 32
Morocco 9.09 21.21 9.09 33
Mozambique 53.13 32
Nigeria 15.15 9.09 6.06 33
Rwanda 6.25 21.88 6.25 32
Senegal 9.68 31
Sierra Leone 12.90 6.45 31
Somalia 3.45 3.45 6.90 6.90 3.45 6.90 29
South Africa 42.42 18.18 33
Sudan 52.38 52.38 4.76 21
Tanzania 3.57 3.57 28
Uganda 3.03 3.03 48.49 39.39 18.18 33
Zambia 15.63 32
Zimbabwe 21.21 18.18 24.24 33
Latin-America
Dominican R. 18.18 3.03 33
El Salvador 3.03 30.30 42.42 33
Guatamela 75.76 54.55 81.82 33
Honduras 3.03 33
Nicaragua 3.23 9.68 6.45 31
Panama 6.06 33
Argentina 3.23 16.13 16.13 31
Chile 12.12 3.03 33
Colombia 27.27 33
Peru 3.03 33.33 33
Uruguay 6.06 33
Note: Continued.Table 1 (Continued): Fraction (%) of Time Spent in Conﬂict by Type
Country Type of Conﬂicts
Middle East EXTBH EXTSH EXTBA EXTSA GENO ETHN REGM REV NOBS
Bangladesh 3.03 6.06 33
Iran 12.12 15.15 36.36 42.42 12.12 9.09 33
Iraq 17.86 14.29 10.71 71.43 28
Israel 9.09 6.06 33
Jordan 3.23 3.23 3.23 3.23 16.13 31
Pakistan 6.06 18.18 51.52 3.03 33
Saudi Arabia 3.45 6.90 29
Syria 6.45 3.23 6.45 3.23 6.45 9.68 31
Yemen 10.00 10.00 20
E. Europe
Yugoslavia 3.33 30




Cyprus 3.03 15.15 21.21 33




China 6.25 3.13 31.25 37.50 12.50 32
India 9.09 100.00 33
Indonesia 9.38 62.50 53.13 3.13 32
Korea (ROK) 3.13 25.00 32
Philippines 24.24 15.15 63.64 12.12 63.64 33
Sri Lanka 30.30 9.09 33
Thailand 21.21 51.52 18.18 33
G7
Canada 3.03 33
U.S.A. 30.30 3.03 33
France 12.12 9.09 33
U.K. 9.09 3.03 33
Italy 3.03 33
Note: See Data Appendix for data descriptions. Each cell contains the fraction of time a country
spent engaged in a given type of conﬂict during the sample period for countries with more than
ﬁve observation on consumption growth.this apparent oversight is that the severity of violence did not reach “full scale war” but rather
“severe clashes.” However, rather than actively amend the data, which could ultimately only cast
suspicion on the results, I accept the coding by the various data sources as deﬁnitive, despite some
such occurrences. Laos and Kuwait provide additional examples of well-known “conﬂicts” that do
not appear in Table 1. Internal war data do, in fact, indicate that Laos was in a sustained state of
ethnic and revolutionary conﬂict throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. The availability of consumption
growth data for Laos (1985-1991) is the limiting factor. Since more than ﬁve years of consumption
growth data are available, Laos is included in the sample. However, because the conﬂict data do
not overlap the consumption growth data no conﬂicts are recorded during this period. Similarly the
Gulf War (1990) is recorded as a full scale war but Kuwait consumption growth is only available
until 1989. Again, such an omission gives strength to the argument that the welfare cost measure
is a lower-bound estimate.
4.2 Estimation
In developing a baseline speciﬁcation for a country’s per-capita consumption growth, and how
conﬂict might aﬀect it, the simple permanent income hypothesis (PIH) provides a very reasonable
starting point.15 According to the PIH, the change in consumption should be unforecastable, so
that information from prior periods is not helpful in predicting future consumption growth. Of
course, current information such as a conﬂict would aﬀect consumption growth and not violate this
basic tenet of the PIH. Furthermore, the adoption of this empirical approach is consistent with the
theoretical treatment of consumption innovations in Section 2.16 Hence, the baseline speciﬁcation
is:
∆log(cit) = α1 · INITit + α2 · CONTit + α3 · COMPLit + Ii + Tt + eit, (8)
15There is also strong statistical evidence to support modeling the eﬀect of conﬂict on consumption in growth rates
rather than in log-levels. See the Supplemental Appendix.
16The PIH, however, does have its limitations: it is derived from a quadratic utility speciﬁcation so that it omits
a precautionary savings motive and it ignores the fact that households might be borrowing constrained. While these
criticisms are likely to be important in micro-studies of household consumption behavior, the general consensus is that
they are not “economically” signiﬁcant in macroeconomic studies of consumption behavior. Indeed, Nelson (1987)
argues that allowing for lagged consumption and income eﬀects eﬀects in U.S. data only generates a very modest R
2
of only about .07.
10where again ∆log(cit) is the log-diﬀerence of per-capita consumption for country i at time t, Ii and
Tt are estimated individual and time ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. For the conﬂict variables, INIT is
the initiation or escalation of a conﬂict, CONT is the continuation of a conﬂict other than its initial
year, and COMPL refers to the completion of a conﬂict. More formally, Wit = 1 if a war-conﬂict
type event occurs for country i in period t. INITit = 1 if ∆Wit > 0, CONTit = 1 if Wit = 1 and
∆Wit = 0, and COMPL = 1 if ∆Wit < 0.17
The empirical speciﬁcation embodied in equation (8) allows for a wide range of dynamics
in how conﬂict aﬀects consumption growth. For example, the initiation of a conﬂict will lead to a
temporary eﬀect on a country’s consumption growth rate, and a permanent eﬀect on the log-level of
consumption, as long as α1, the coeﬃcient on INIT, diﬀers from zero. Moreover, separately allow-
ing for conﬂict continuations to aﬀect consumption is meant to capture the possibility that conﬂicts
that last longer than a year, CONT, may lead to diﬀerent expected consumption paths than if the
conﬂict was short and lasted one period. Finally, there remains the possibility that any eﬀects of
conﬂict on consumption growth may reverse themselves once the conﬂict has reached completion.
Such rebound eﬀects are proxied by including COMPL in the speciﬁcation. Taken together, the
empirical speciﬁcation in equation (8) allows for initial eﬀects of conﬂict on consumption, duration
eﬀects of conﬂict on consumption, and the reversal of these forces upon the completion of a conﬂict.
However, below in Table 5, I explore some changes in the speciﬁcation to examine the robustness
of our lower bound estimates of the welfare costs of conﬂict.18
17Note that the dummy variables embody an implicit structure in the evolution in the observed states of conﬂict.
For instance, for a given type of conﬂict (e.g. Big Wars at Home), let s1t = 1 if peace at time t and zero otherwise,
let s2t = 1 if INIT at time t and zero otherwise, let s3t = 1 if CONT at time t and zero otherwise, and let s4t = 1 if














φ11 0 0 φ14
φ21 0 0 φ24
0 φ32 φ33 0














The transition matrix indicates that the state of peace can only be followed by peace or an initiation. An initiation
can only be followed by a continution of conﬂict or its completion. The continuation of a conﬂict can only be followed
by a further continution or a completion of the conﬂict. And the completion of a conﬂict can only be followed by
peace or by the initiation of a new conﬂict. Note further that φ11 = 1 − φ21, φ14 = 1 − φ24, φ32 = 1 − φ42, and
φ33 = 1 − φ43. Following standard procedures, one can estimate the steady state fractions of peace and conﬂict
per-country. Unfortunately, the size of the transition matrix becomes too unwieldy to estimate for eight separate
types of conﬂict in order to obtain these steady-state vectors. Nevertheless, this study compares the growth and
volatility of consumption under the observed historically observed fraction of peace and conﬂict (rather than the
steady state fractions), with the growth and volatility of consumption when the only observed state is that of peace.
18Another potential source of error in the speciﬁcation is the possible dynamic nature of the relationship being
estimated. Although this would not bias the estimated coeﬃcients of the impact of conﬂict on growth, the estimated
11Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (8) using data for all 147 countries for which
there is consumption data–see Data Appendix.19 The estimated standard errors of the coeﬃcients,
reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of unknown form–see
Newey and West (1987). The ﬁrst column of Table 2 displays the average eﬀect of the initiation of
conﬂict on a country’s per-capita consumption growth rate, controlling for ﬁxed individual country
and time eﬀects. All eight individual types of conﬂict under consideration are included in the
regression.20 Columns two and three of Table 2 display the average eﬀect of continuation and
completion of conﬂict, respectively. I report in the last three columns results from a parsimonious
speciﬁcation that includes only the variables that were statistically signiﬁcant below the .1 level
when all of the coeﬃcients are estimated jointly. Importantly, the eﬀects reported in columns four
through six are used in the welfare calculations presented below. Also, Table 2 reports the adjusted
R2, sum of squared residuals, and the number of observations.
Taking the ﬁrst column as an example, the coeﬃcient on EXTBH is negative and statis-
tically signiﬁcant at below the .05 level. This implies that the initiation or escalation of a large
external war on a nation’s home territory lowers annual per-capita consumption growth by 4.4
percentage points. One can also interpret this ﬁnding as that consumption growth would be more
than 4 percentage points higher than observed for the year that a country was involved in the
initiation or escalation of a large external home war–provided the country had somehow managed
to avoid conﬂict.
All of the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in Table 2 have the expected (negative) sign,
standard errors of the coeﬃcients would be biased. In fact, simple least squares would provide a consistent but
ineﬃcient estimate of the coeﬃcients, though, as mentioned, a non-robust estimate of the standard errors would
be biased. The latter is not a problem in the results below as the estimated standard errors were calculated as in
Newey-West, where I have corrected for heteroskedasticity of unknown form and allow for serial correlation of up to a
fourth order moving average. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest an alternative way to explicitly estimate a dynamic
panel data model with ﬁxed eﬀects by instrumenting a version of equation (8) which also includes a lagged dependent
variable. Note that in comparing the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimates of the mean eﬀect of war (not shown) to
those estimates in Table 2, the pattern of signiﬁcance is identical and the coeﬃcients are very similar in magnitude.
19That is, the regressions are estimated with data for 62 countries that faced some type of conﬂict and 85 countries
that did not.
20The ﬁndings in Table 1 suggest a positive correlation between certain types of conﬂicts (e.g. genocide and ethnic
conﬂicts. The average correlation between genocide and ethnic conﬂicts across countries with at least one genocide is
0.42. The average correlation between genocide and ethnic conﬂicts for countries with at least one ethnic conﬂict is
0.31. Similarly, the average correlations for regime changes and revolutions are only 0.10 and 0.17. However, this does
not materially aﬀect the results below. For example, when I experimented with a variable that combined a number
of these conﬂicts to ensure that multicollinearity was not a problem, the pattern of signiﬁcance was unchanged and
the magnitudes remained similar.
12Table 2: Estimated Eﬀect of Conﬂict on Real Per-Capita Consumption Growth
Individual Speciﬁcation Joint Speciﬁcation
INIT CONT COMPL INIT CONT COMPL
EXTBH −4.37∗∗ −10.47∗∗ −4.49∗∗ −4.59∗∗ −10.97∗∗ −3.36∗
(2.18) (4.71) (1.96) (1.98) (4.92) (1.82)
EXTSH −8.83 0.17 −3.54
(6.19) (1.95) (6.11)
EXTBA − 4.06∗∗∗ 0.45 −0.90 −2.31∗
(1.49) (0.76) (1.20) (1.23)
EXTSA 0.97 −0.57 − 4.58∗∗∗ −3.79∗∗
(1.72) (0.82) (1.70) (1.87)
GENO −5.96∗∗ −0.20 0.01 −5.78∗∗
(2.65) (1.13) (2.89) (2.40)
ETHN 0.01 0.53 0.72
(2.04) (0.75) (4.69)
REGM −2.31 − 3.74∗∗∗ −0.28 − 3.52∗∗∗
(1.83) (1.02) (2.31) (0.87)
REV −3.41 −1.18 0.69
(2.69) (0.94) (5.35)
R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
σ2 8.79 8.82 8.83 8.81
NOBS 4273 4273 4273 4273
Notes: See Data Appendix for deﬁnitions. The ﬁrst three columns of results report the estimated
eﬀects from equation (8), when the initiation and escalation of a conﬂict (INIT), the continuation of
a conﬂict (CONT) and the completion of a conﬂict (COMPL) are estimated separately. The results
in the ﬁnal three columns are for when all three measures of conﬂict are included simultaneously and
only those coeﬃcients that were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at below the .1 level were retained
in the speciﬁcation. The estimated standard errors, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation of unknown form–see Newey and West (1987). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance
at below the .1, .05 and .01 levels, respectively.indicating that conﬂict does indeed have an adverse aﬀect on consumption growth. It may not be
any more surprising that the initiation, continuation, and completion of a large external war on
one’s home territory (EXTBH & INIT, EXTBH & CONT, EXTBH & COMPL) are all statistically
signiﬁcant in the joint speciﬁcation. Perhaps more interesting is that the impact of such a conﬂict
on annual per-capita consumption growth, provided it lasts more than a single year, is a cumulative
loss of nearly 20 (18.92) percentage points. Continuation alone costs consumers nearly 11 percent
per year in terms of consumption growth. The initiation of genocides and large external wars fought
away (GENO & INIT, EXTBA & INIT), the continuation of regime changes past their initiation
(REGM & CONT), and the completion of small external wars fought away (EXTSA & COMPL)
are also signiﬁcant in reducing consumption growth below what it would otherwise have been in a
state of peace.21
From the results in the last three columns of Table 2, one can construct a “synthetic”
growth rate were an economy to be perpetually at peace as follows. From the estimated, ﬁtted









it. Interestingly, by netting out the eﬀect of wars on consumption growth
from expression (8), the estimation procedure allows the country’s estimated individual eﬀects
as well as the aggregate time eﬀects to change. In essence, b µ∗
i confounds both eﬀects so that
even countries who do not experience war may be beneﬁcially impacted if aggregate consumption
growth strengthens because other countries become more peaceful. To separate out these two
eﬀects, deﬁne b µ∗0




t where ˆ T
0
t were obtained from a constrained form of expression
(8) where α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.22 Simply put, b µ∗0
i is the estimate of the ith country’s consumption
growth rate if it were only to enjoy the local-direct beneﬁts from peace, while b µ∗
i includes both the
local-direct and global beneﬁts of consumption growth from peace.23
21These results concur with Caplan (2001) who ﬁnds that real output growth falls substantially during domestic
wars. However, in contrast, Caplan also ﬁnds that real output growth rises slightly during foreign wars. I believe that
this may be due to his use of a smaller data set (66 countries) and failure to parse out the initiation, continuation,
and conclusion of internal and external conﬂicts as well as the various types of internal conﬂict.
22Namely, the ˆ T
0
t are estimated from the regression: ∆log(cit) = Ii + T
0
t + error.
23In an important contribution, Alesina and Spolaore (2000) demonstrate that this global “peace dividend” may
not materialize in a world where the number and size of nations is endogenous, and the per-capita costs of defense
spending decline with the country size.
13Turning now to the impact of conﬂict on economic volatility, Table 3 presents the indi-
vidually and jointly estimated eﬀects of eliminating diﬀerent types of conﬂict on the variance of
mean-adjusted consumption growth. The construction of a synthetic measure of the volatility (ei-
ther standard deviation or variance) of consumption during peace involves two steps: estimating
the mean squared growth in consumption during peace and the squared mean growth in consump-
tion during peace. Fortunately, the latter has been calculated, (b µ∗
i)2. Hence, to insure that this
volatility measure does not become negative, I adopt the following speciﬁcation for the squared
growth of per-capita consumption.
|X∗
it|2 = exp{2 · [δ1 · INITit + δ2 · CONTit + δ3 · COMPLit + Ii + Tt + uit]} (9)
According to this exponential speciﬁcation, the squared change in per-capita consumption growth
will always be positive, and one can estimate the ﬁxed individual and time eﬀects and the eﬀect
of conﬂict on volatility using non-linear least squares. A more appealing approach, however, is to
take natural logs of both sides of (9) so that one can estimate these same crucial parameters using
least squares, namely:
log(|X∗
it|) = δ1INITit + δ2 · CONTit + δ3 · COMPLit + Ii + Tt + uit (10)
Notice that one can come up with a reasonable measure of the eﬀect of conﬂict on consumption
volatility by estimating the parameters of the transformed model.
As in Table 2, the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 display results from the initiation, con-
tinuation, and completion of conﬂict estimated individually, and the last three columns present a
parsimonious joint speciﬁcation which excludes insigniﬁcant regressors. Again taking column 1 as
an example, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on GENO is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the
.01 level. This implies that the volatility of consumption growth is higher during the initiation
of genocides. The adjusted R2 (0.20) indicates that the speciﬁcation explains a larger fraction of
consumption growth variance than was the case for consumption growth displayed in Table 2.
Several noteworthy distinctions separate Table 3 from Table 2. Among the statistically
14Table 3: Estimated Eﬀect of Conﬂict on Real Per-Capita Consumption Volatility
Individual Speciﬁcation Joint Speciﬁcation
INIT CONT COMPL INIT CONT COMPL
EXTBH 0.26 −0.18 0.41∗∗
(0.20) (0.29) (0.17)
EXTSH 0.34 − 4.96∗∗∗ 0.21 − 4.92∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.26) (0.36) (0.26)
EXTBA 0.24 −0.15 0.09
(0.16) (0.12) (0.16)
EXTSA 0.07 −0.08 −0.57
(0.30) (0.19) (0.30)
GENO 0.70∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.07 0.75∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.14) (0.24) (0.20)
ETHN −0.10 0.10 0.85∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.10) (0.26) (0.25)
REGM 0.39∗∗ 0.31∗∗ −0.11 0.40∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.18) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13)
REV 0.21 0.05 0.23
(0.28) (0.16) (0.29)
R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
σ2 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16
NOBS 4273 4273 4273 4273
Notes: See Table 2. The ﬁrst three columns of results report the estimated eﬀects from equation
(10), when the initiation and escalation of a conﬂict (INIT), the continuation of a conﬂict (CONT)
and the completion of a conﬂict (COMPL) are estimated separately. The results in the ﬁnal three
columns are for when all three measures of conﬂict are included simultaneously and only those
coeﬃcients that were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at below the .1 level were retained in the
speciﬁcation.signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the joint volatility speciﬁcation (GENO & INIT, REGM & INIT, EXTSH
& CONT, REGM & CONT, and ETHN & COMPL), only the continuation of regime changes
also aﬀected the average level of consumption growth. Further, conﬂicts do not uniformly increase
volatility in the same manner in which they were found to lower consumption growth. The contin-
uation of small external home wars decreases volatility. In fact, the estimated decrease in volatility
due to EXTSH & CONT is much greater than the largest increase (ETHN & COMPL).
Using the estimates from equation (10) presented in the last three columns of Table 3, one
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o
. From this expression, one can calculate the variance of peaceful









i]2. Again, as in the case for mean consumption
growth, b σ2∗
i combines both the country’s individual growth improvement with the indirect beneﬁt
from faster world consumption growth in a peaceful world. Hence, following the earlier deﬁnition
of b µ∗0
i , deﬁne b σ2∗0
i the global volatility of consumption is assumed unchanged if the world were to
move to peace.24
Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 lead to one obvious conclusion: very diﬀerent types of conﬂict
aﬀect the level and volatility of consumption growth. Large external home wars, the initiation
of large conﬂicts with foreign countries, the continuation of disruptive regime changes, and the
completion of small external foreign conﬂicts reduce average per-capita consumption growth. The
initiation of genocides and disruptive regime changes, the continuation of disruptive regime changes,
and the completion of ethnic wars increase the volatility of per-capita consumption growth while
the continuation of small external foreign wars decrease its volatility.
4.3 Welfare Calculations
To implement the welfare calculations embodied in expression (6), parameter values for the discount
rate (θ) and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (ρ) must be provided, in addition to the con-
sumption growth and volatility measures calculated from ﬁndings in Tables 2 and 3. Columns one
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15through six of Table 4 provide these latter measures: namely, they present on a country-by-country
basis the observed and constructed economic characteristics required for implementing the welfare
calculations of conﬂict. Columns seven and eight contain the estimated welfare cost of conﬂict for
the local-direct and global beneﬁts of peace. The last two columns of Table 4 provide an indication
of the sensitivity of these welfare calculations to changes in θ and ρ.
Columns one and three of Table 4 present the observed mean growth rates of consumption
per-person, b µi, and the counterfactual or synthetic mean growth rate of consumption per-person
growth that has been adjusted to remove the impact of conﬂict, b µ∗
i. We also report in column two
the “synthetic” peaceful growth of consumption when the potential global beneﬁt from reduced
conﬂict is removed, b µ∗0
i . Columns four and six present the observed standard deviation of the
growth of consumption per-person, b σ2
i , and the variance of consumption growth adjusted to remove
the eﬀect of conﬂict, b σ2∗
i . Again, column ﬁve reports the “synthetic” peaceful standard deviation
of consumption when the potential global beneﬁt from reduced conﬂict is removed, (b σ∗0
i ). To re-
iterate, while the empirical speciﬁcations (8) and (10) impose the restriction that a given type of
conﬂict has the same impact on each country for a given year, countries will have diﬀering growth
and volatility beneﬁts from peace based on the types of conﬂicts in their observed data as well as
the frequency with which they were in conﬂict.
The ﬁnal step in implementing the welfare calculation, (6), is to specify values for θ and ρ.
Clearly, changes in θ and ρ will aﬀect τi. Four important issues in the selection of these parameters
should be kept in mind. First, the parameter values should be plausible. Second, the parameters
should be such that Φi < 1 and Φ∗
i < 1 for all countries – see expression (3). Third, the parameter
values selected should be suggestive of a lower bound for τi. Fourth, the reader should get an
indication of the robustness of τi to changes in the values chosen for θ and ρ.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 provide results for the welfare measures using θ = .08 and
ρ = 2. These values were chosen for the following reasons, based on the criteria just discussed.
First, these parameter values are certainly plausible, even though θ looks a bit high and ρ looks
a bit low. Second, for all countries, Φi < 1 and Φ∗
i < 1 when evaluated at these values of θ and
ρ. Third, and most importantly, these parameters provide a relatively robust lower bound for the
16Table 4: Welfare Calculations
Growth Volatility Cost Elasticity
Country ˆ µi ˆ µ∗0
i ˆ µ∗








Algeria 1.22 1.90 1.97 14.91 10.09 10.20 26.91 27.67 0.99 −1.15
Angola −2.82 −2.62 −2.54 12.86 7.85 7.86 38.18 40.49 3.82 −2.36
Benin 0.10 0.65 0.73 6.64 6.62 6.71 7.18 8.02 0.06 −1.04
Burundi −0.96 −0.27 −0.19 10.83 10.25 10.36 14.24 15.18 0.97 −1.37
Chad −1.58 −0.80 −0.73 14.67 13.96 14.11 24.51 25.35 2.40 −1.91
Congo −1.11 −0.09 −0.01 14.24 12.41 12.55 32.26 33.18 1.84 −1.67
Egypt 2.47 3.68 3.75 4.38 4.63 4.67 10.94 11.59 −0.60 −0.78
Ethiopia 0.28 0.87 0.95 3.44 3.66 3.69 7.02 7.91 −0.14 −0.98
Ghana 0.07 0.39 0.46 10.17 9.88 9.99 5.40 6.18 0.47 −1.14
Lesotho 1.90 1.90 1.98 9.77 9.57 9.66 0.43 1.05 0.09 −0.90
Liberia −0.22 −0.13 −0.05 12.39 12.37 12.50 1.52 2.26 0.65 −1.28
Madagascar −2.51 −2.18 −2.10 4.97 4.87 4.92 6.89 8.33 1.14 −1.55
Mauritania 0.34 1.35 1.42 10.75 10.54 10.65 14.58 15.30 0.28 −1.11
Morocco 2.64 3.97 4.05 6.25 6.34 6.41 12.16 12.77 −0.58 −0.78
Nigeria 1.48 1.69 1.77 13.94 12.90 13.04 6.52 7.04 0.80 −1.06
Rwanda 0.33 0.62 0.70 9.67 9.33 9.43 4.82 5.60 0.37 −1.08
Senegal 0.82 1.05 1.13 5.45 5.37 5.43 2.72 3.52 −0.13 −0.94
Sierra Leone −0.03 0.20 0.27 6.73 6.45 6.52 3.51 4.41 0.24 −1.06
Somalia −1.48 −0.93 −0.85 19.85 20.05 20.26 21.01 20.77 6.08 −3.31
South Africa 0.84 0.91 0.99 5.58 5.51 5.56 0.91 1.72 −0.10 −0.94
Sudan 1.48 1.92 2.00 10.71 9.61 9.71 7.88 8.54 0.26 −0.96
Tanzania 0.61 0.98 1.06 7.49 7.65 7.73 4.22 5.00 −0.08 −0.99
Uganda 0.06 1.07 1.15 9.25 8.74 8.84 15.38 15.38 16.20 −1.11
Zambia −1.55 −1.11 −1.03 8.83 8.46 8.55 9.23 9.23 10.35 −1.42
Zimbabwe −0.45 0.08 0.16 9.93 7.24 7.33 15.35 15.35 16.32 −1.22
Notes: See Tables 2 and 3. The ﬁrst six columns provide observed and synthetic measures of the
mean and standard deviation of consumption growth by country. ˆ µi and ˆ σi are the mean and
standard deviation of observed consumption growth for each country i. b µ∗0
i is the estimate of the
ith country’s consumption growth rate if it were only to enjoy the local-direct beneﬁts from peace,
while b µ∗
i includes both the local-direct and global beneﬁts to consumption growth from peace. b σ∗0
i
is the estimate of the ith country’s consumption growth volatility (i.e. standard deviation) if it
were only to enjoy the local-direct beneﬁts from peace, while b σ∗
i includes both the local-direct and
global beneﬁts to consumption volatility from peace. The welfare calculations are obtained using
expressions (6) for the values ρ = 2.0 and θ = .08. Note that while all countries will beneﬁt from
reduced conﬂict due to the global eﬀect of improved world consumption growth, I only report in
Table 4 the welfare improvement for countries who have been directly involved in conﬂict. The
average values of τ∗
i for countries that did not engage in conﬂict is 0.72. The last two columns of
Table 4 display the elasticity of τ∗
i with respect to ρ and θ – the formulae are contained in footnote
25.Table 4 (Continued): Welfare Calculations
Growth Volatility Cost Elasticity
Country ˆ µi ˆ µ∗0
i ˆ µ∗








Argentina 0.61 1.39 1.47 5.51 4.98 5.04 9.93 10.76 −0.10 −0.96
Chile 1.48 1.66 1.73 13.23 13.07 13.20 2.76 3.28 0.31 −1.04
Dominican R. 2.11 2.64 2.72 7.92 7.35 7.45 6.30 6.92 −0.23 −0.85
El Salvador 0.36 0.78 0.86 5.10 4.63 4.68 5.65 6.53 0.02 −0.99
Guatemala 0.78 0.95 1.03 3.08 3.11 3.14 1.96 2.80 −0.21 −0.92
Honduras 0.70 0.94 1.02 3.41 3.53 3.57 2.67 3.51 −0.20 −0.93
Nicaragua −1.29 −1.06 −0.99 9.54 8.19 8.29 8.30 9.39 1.32 −1.39
Panama 1.66 1.77 1.84 6.95 6.97 7.05 1.10 1.79 −0.32 −0.87
Peru 0.37 0.37 0.45 5.92 5.89 5.95 0.06 0.92 0.00 −1.00
Uruguay 0.58 0.69 0.77 5.92 5.94 6.00 1.25 2.08 −0.09 −0.97
E. Europe
Greece 3.99 3.99 4.06 3.04 3.03 3.06 0.00 0.59 −0.72 −0.68
Yugoslavia 4.08 4.08 4.15 10.53 10.23 10.34 0.56 1.02 −0.12 −0.74
W. Europe (Non - G7)
Cyprus 5.84 6.61 6.69 7.59 6.07 6.15 6.82 7.26 −0.69 −0.62
Portugal 4.32 4.65 4.73 5.71 5.74 5.80 2.55 3.08 −0.74 −0.68
Turkey 2.44 2.51 2.59 4.27 4.06 4.10 0.83 1.50 −0.38 −0.78
Oceana
Australia 1.93 2.00 2.08 1.84 1.83 1.85 0.69 1.42 −0.43 −0.81
S.E. Asia (Non - G7)
China 2.69 3.44 3.52 5.57 5.25 5.30 7.18 7.82 −0.51 −0.78
India 1.49 2.21 2.29 4.73 4.45 4.49 7.82 8.57 −0.33 −0.87
Indonesia 3.03 3.46 3.54 3.99 4.06 4.10 3.72 4.35 −0.62 −0.74
Korea (ROK) 5.40 5.80 5.87 4.07 4.25 4.29 2.62 3.12 −0.91 −0.62
Philippines 1.09 1.65 1.73 2.72 2.82 2.85 6.05 6.85 −0.32 −0.89
Thailand 3.58 3.97 4.05 3.82 3.60 3.64 3.34 3.94 −0.64 −0.71
Middle East
Bangladesh 0.29 0.40 0.47 6.37 5.72 5.79 2.34 3.20 0.33 −1.01
Iran 0.83 2.50 2.58 9.83 7.65 7.76 25.50 26.24 0.08 −1.02
Iraq −0.31 1.86 1.94 17.45 15.14 15.29 64.65 65.27 1.96 −1.74
Israel 3.37 4.23 4.31 4.73 4.82 4.87 7.20 7.79 −0.68 −1.72
Jordan 2.87 3.33 3.40 10.82 10.71 10.82 4.71 5.22 −0.30 −0.83
Pakistan 2.09 2.92 3.00 6.32 5.75 5.80 8.94 9.62 −0.37 −0.83
Saudi Arabia 5.53 5.87 5.94 9.73 9.49 9.58 2.86 3.27 −0.66 −0.65
Syria 3.46 4.77 4.85 15.37 14.74 14.90 15.75 16.02 −0.04 −0.89
G7
Canada 2.38 2.45 2.52 2.74 2.56 2.59 0.74 1.44 −0.43 −0.78
France 2.85 3.15 3.23 1.49 1.54 1.55 2.62 3.28 −0.60 −0.74
Italy 3.92 3.99 4.07 2.26 2.21 2.23 0.57 1.16 −0.70 −0.68
U.K. 2.16 2.42 2.49 2.56 2.40 2.43 2.50 3.21 −0.45 −0.80
U.S.A. 2.04 2.30 2.37 1.84 1.88 1.90 2.44 3.16 −0.47 −0.80welfare calculations. To demonstrate this, columns 9 and 10 of Table 4 present the point elasticity
measure of τi with respect to ρ and θ, τiθ and τiρ, respectively.25 These elasticity measures answer
the following simple question: If the value of ρ (θ) changes by x percentage points, by how many
percentage points does τi change? Namely, by %∆τi = x · τiρ.
Table 4 aﬃrms that the world could beneﬁt greatly from eliminating conﬂict.26 Estimates
of the economic cost of conﬂict for each country are given in columns 7 and 8. The estimates diﬀer
depending on whether or not the global beneﬁt to a country if all conﬂict is removed. The table
is arranged by region. This table has two key ﬁndings. First, most countries, many of whom are
quite poor, would be willing to permanently pay a substantial amount to live a peaceful world. For
example, in Africa, the countries who would gain the most from peace would be Angola and the
Congo. I ﬁnd that a citizen of the Angola would permanently give up to 40.5 percent of his current
level of consumption in order to live in a peaceful world (38.2 percent if only local-direct eﬀects
are allowed), while a citizen of the Congo would give up 33.2 (32.3) percent. Argentina, Cyprus,
India and Iraq are countries that would pay the most in their respective regions to live in a more
peaceful world.27 Argentina would permanently give up about 11 percent of current consumption
to live in peace, Cyprus and India 7 to 8 percent, while Iraq would willingly sacriﬁce around 65
percent of current consumption.
Second, using a relatively low value of ρ and a high value of θ suggests that, on average,
I am computing a lower bound estimate of the beneﬁts of peace. Returning to the example of








log(1 + τi) +


































26While all countries will beneﬁt from reduced conﬂict due to the global eﬀect of improved world consumption
growth, only the welfare improvement for countries who have been directly involved in conﬂict are reported in Table
4. The average value of τi for countries that did not engage in conﬂict is 0.72. One can consider this to be the
measure of a global “peace dividend.”
27The calculations for the G7, Oceana and Eastern Europe are quite a bit lower and so are not discussed in detail.
However, it is worth noting that the beneﬁt from eliminating business cycles using Lucas’ original calculation–where
shocks to the log-level of consumption are i.i.d. around a deterministic trend – is 0.07 percent for the United States.
If instead I use the same methodology and perform a Lucas-type calculation of the beneﬁt from eliminating the
innovations to the consumption growth rate, this increases to 0.33 percent. The United States’ global beneﬁt from
eliminating conﬂict (3.2 percent) clearly outweighs both of these other calculations.
17Angola, the elasticiy of τi with respect to ρ (τiρ) is 3.82 which implies that doubling ρ from 2 to 4
would increase τi by 382% – namely, to 155 percent of current consumption. Similarly, the elasticiy
of τi with respect to θ (τiθ) is -2.36 implies that decreasing θ from .08 to .04 would increase τi by
236% – namely to 95 percent of current consumption. From Table 4, however, one can see that
τiθ are all negative, suggesting that choosing a high discount factor of θ = .08 is biasing down
the estimates of the consumption welfare cost of conﬂict. In contrast, the eﬀect of a rise in the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ρ, has ambiguous eﬀects on the change in τi. Indeed for many
countries, such as those in the G7, the reported values for τiρ are negative. For the U.S., in fact,
doubling ρ from 2 to 4 would lower τ∗
i by about one-half, so that the consumption welfare cost of
conﬂict would be about 1.5 percent of current consumption. However, as demonstrated in Table
5 below, on average the value for τiρ is positive, so that the selection of a relatively low value of
ρ = 2 is not systematically lowering the value of τ∗
i for the average country.
The top panel of Table 5 summarizes the ﬁndings reported in Table 4. On average, a world
consumer who lives in a country that has experienced conﬂict over the time period considered (top
row), would willingly give up approximately 9 percent of his annual level of consumption as a one
time payment in order to live in a world of perpetual peace. Taking the ﬁrst panel of Table 5, row
one indicates that the average estimated annual per-capita consumption growth on the synthetic,
conﬂict-free consumption path (b µ∗) is 0.57 percentage points higher than the average observed
consumption growth (b µ). Similarly, the average of the standard deviation of ‘peaceful’ consumption
growth, b σ∗ = 7.21, is less than the volatility of observed consumption growth, b σ = 7.66. Also, the
average elasticity of the welfare measure τ∗
i with respect to ρ and θ are positive and negative,
respectively, suggesting that higher values of ρ and lower values of θ will make the costs of war
higher. Moreover, the average value of τiθ is approximately −1, while that for τiρ is closer to zero,
with the latter having a standard deviation that is over two times larger than the former.28
In the remaining panels of Table 5 I experiment with broader speciﬁcations for how conﬂict
aﬀects a country’s expected consumption path. To wit, I allow for region speciﬁc variation in the b α’s
and b δ’s. I also attempt to control for possible reverse causality of weak consumption growth leading
28A simple test reveals that the average value for τiθ (τiρ) is (is not) signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in a two-tailed
test at or below the .10 level.
18Table 5: Robustness of Welfare Calculations
Uncensored without Regional Parameter Variation
Growth Volatility Cost Elasticity
Country ˆ µi ˆ µ∗0
i ˆ µ∗







average 1.34 1.83 1.91 7.66 7.13 7.21 8.61 9.35 0.21 −1.04
std 1.91 1.93 1.93 4.26 3.85 3.89 11.02 11.09 1.15 0.44
median 1.15 1.73 1.81 6.51 6.20 6.28 5.52 6.35 −0.10 −0.94
Censored without Regional Parameter Variation
Growth Volatility Cost Elasticity
Country ˆ µi ˆ µ∗0
i ˆ µ∗







average 1.36 1.85 1.88 7.92 7.41 7.39 8.89 9.40 0.30 −1.05
std 1.97 1.98 1.98 4.16 3.83 3.81 12.61 12.80 1.20 0.45
median 1.15 1.67 1.70 6.84 6.49 6.51 5.56 5.73 0.02 −0.95
Uncensored with Regional Parameter Variation
Growth Volatility Cost Elasticity
Country ˆ µi ˆ µ∗0
i ˆ µ∗







average 0.98 1.54 8.36 7.26 12.53 0.62 −1.10
std 1.82 1.77 4.17 3.71 18.55 1.37 0.47
median 0.78 1.11 7.49 6.62 6.87 0.35 −0.98
Censored with Regional Parameter Variation
Growth Volatility Cost Elasticity
Country ˆ µi ˆ µ∗0
i ˆ µ∗







average 0.88 1.59 8.17 7.49 14.16 0.38 −1.10
std 1.59 1.43 4.29 4.02 23.08 2.15 0.46
median 0.80 1.55 6.84 6.73 5.90 −0.10 −0.98
Notes: See Table 4. The top panel provides cross-country summary statistics for the data in Table
4. The rows report the mean, standard deviation and median of the cross country statistics for
each column. The second panel repeats this exercise when all conﬂicts are censored as follows: if
the conﬂict is preceded by a year when the growth of per-capita consumption is more than one
standard deviation below the country’s mean per-capita consumption growth, the conﬂict is not
counted as having occurred. Though not shown, this will change the estimated parameters in Tables
2 and 3. The third panel returns to the non-censored deﬁnition of conﬂict, though the estimated
parameters in equation (8) were obtained by estimating the equation separately over the following
regional sub-samples: Africa, Latin America, South East Asia (non-G7), Latin America, Oceana,
Eastern Europe, Western Europe (non-G7) and G7. The fourth panel allows for both the censored
deﬁnition of conﬂict and region-by-region parameter variation. Only local-direct eﬀects of conﬂict
ˆ µ∗0
and ˆ σ∗0
are reported when estimating over the regional sub-samples.to conﬂict, such as the “diversionary wars” of the type suggested by Hess and Orphanides (1995).
Hess and Orphanides (1995) develop a diversionary theory of external conﬂict wherein elected
leaders with innate but unknown conﬂict handling skills may initiate conﬂict during economic
downturns in order to reveal these skills and help their chances at re-election.29 Accordingly, I
explore censoring the data such that if a conﬂict is immediately preceded by a year when per-
capita consumption growth was more than one standard deviation below the country’s average
per-capita consumption growth, the conﬂict is not counted as having occurred.
The results presented in the ﬁnal three panels of Table 5 are broadly in line with the base
speciﬁcation. In general, these modiﬁcations slightly increase the average estimated cost of conﬂict.
Censoring the war data without allowing for regional variation (panel 2) only slightly increases the
average global and local-direct welfare gains from peace but decreases the median gain. Censoring
also signiﬁcantly increases the average local-direct gain from peace but again decreases the median
when regional variation is allowed (panels 3 and 4). Allowing for region by region estimation of
the eﬀect of conﬂict on growth increases the average and median gain from peace irrespective of
censoring. The average elasticity of τi with respect to ρ remains positive across all panels, while
the elasticity of τi with respect to θ is essentially unaﬀected at −1.0.
To further understand the potential beneﬁts to a country from living in a peaceful world,
Table 6 reports empirical results for the factors which inﬂuence these beneﬁts. In particular, I am
interested in the regional, economic and governmental inﬂuences that indicate whether a country is
more likely to gain from a peaceful world. The dependent variable in each regression is a country’s
willingness to pay in order to move to a more peaceful world. All countries for which there are
data are used in these empirical estimates, since all countries may enjoy the global beneﬁts from
reduced conﬂict. Hence, there is data for 147 countries rather than just those listed in Table 4.
The general speciﬁcation is:
τ∗
i = Constant + Ri + θ1 · Economicsi + θ2 · DEMOi + θ3 · (Economicsi × DEMOi) + vi, (11)
29As Meade (1940) states: “Poverty, and in particular the fall from comfort to poverty in a period of national
economic collapse, breeds a state of mind in which military adventures appear more attractive than would otherwise
be the case.” (p. 15)
19τ∗
i = Constant + Ri + θ1 · Economicsi + θ2 · DEMOi + θ3 · (Economicsi × DEMOi) + vi
Table 6: Factors Inﬂuencing A Country’s Potential Gain from Peace
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Constant 1.92∗∗∗ 3.49 2.54∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 13.08 11.89
(0.44) (6.57) (0.50) (0.44) (0.78) (8.13) (8.68)
Africa 4.72∗∗∗ 4.36∗ 5.38∗∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗ 1.26 1.89
(1.37) (2.27) (1.38) (1.12) (1.47) (2.36) (1.90)
Latin-America 0.13 −0.05 0.97 −0.60 −0.48 −1.33 0.22
(0.67) (1.01) (0.76) (0.88) (0.66) (1.63) (0.95)
E. Europe −1.29∗∗∗ −1.46∗ −1.07∗∗ −1.29∗∗∗ − 2.16∗∗∗ −2.81∗∗ −2.26∗∗
(0.44) (0.85) (0.47) (0.44) (0.74) (1.23) (1.09)
W. Europe −0.64 −0.70 0.22 −0.64 −0.89 −0.23 −0.65
(0.60) (0.65) (0.72) (0.60) (0.64) (0.90) (0.65)
Oceana −1.36∗∗∗ −1.50∗ 0.02 −1.36∗∗∗ −1.93∗∗∗ −1.09 −0.27
(0.51) (0.80) (0.75) (0.51) (0.69) (1.24) (0.87)
S.E. Asia 0.74 0.42 1.71∗ 0.71 0.02 −0.69 −0.39
(0.86) (1.56) (0.90) (0.86) (1.03) (1.94) (1.50)
Middle East 8.66∗ 8.57∗ 9.80∗∗ 3.40 7.75∗ 2.56 2.09
(4.50) (4.47) (4.56) (3.57) (4.30) (3.24) (3.14)
log(GDPIini) −0.18 −1.11 −0.95
(0.76) (0.96) (1.15)
OPENini −0.02∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EXPFUEL 10.53∗∗ 12.19∗∗ 15.10∗∗
(4.80) (5.11) (5.88)









2 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.26
σ2 7.86 7.88 7.81 7.88 7.88 7.25 7.12
NOBS 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Notes: Regressions include all 147 countries for which data are available as all countries may enjoy
the global beneﬁts from reduced conﬂict. The dependent variable in each regression is τ∗
i compute
for ρ = 2.0 θ = .08. Ri are the regional dummy variables (G7 countries omitted). DEMOi = 1
indicates that the government was deemed democratic at the beginning of the sample. The economic
variables I consider are each country’s initial log-level of real GDP per-capita, whether a country’s
exports are more than ﬁfty percent related to fuel (EXPFUEL = 1) and the initial openness of
each country’s economy (OPEN), as measured by initial exports plus imports, divided by GDP–see
the Data Appendix. Table 6 indicates that Eastern European countries would be willing to give
up less consumption growth than the G7 to live in a state of peace. However, if Eastern Europe is
dropped from the sample (not shown) the regression is virtually unchanged.where Ri represents the estimated regional eﬀects. The governance variable in the regression is
DEMOi which indicates whether the government was deemed to be democratic or not at the
beginning of the sample–See Gurr and Harﬀ (1997). The economic variables considered are the
country’s initial log-level of real GDP per-capita, whether the country’s exports are more than ﬁfty
percent related to fuel (EXPFUEL) and the initial openness of each country’s economy (OPEN),
as measured by initial exports plus imports, divided by GDP–see the Data Appendix.
In column (I) of Table 6, I present the empirical results when just the regional eﬀects are
estimated. Notice that in order to avoid collinearity, I include a constant though G7 is removed
as an explanatory variable. Interestingly, the regional variation suggests that, relative to the G7
countries, Africa and the Middle East have signiﬁcantly more to gain from a more peaceful world,
while Eastern Europe and Oceana have less to gain.30 In columns (II) through (V), I present
evidence on the additional impact of economic factors on the welfare costs of conﬂict. The regression
results indicate that the primary economic factor is a country’s openness and whether the country
is a fuel exporter – columns (III) and (IV). As for the former ﬁnding, an increase in a country’s
trade sector tends to lower their expected gain from peace. In other words, closed economies have
more to gain from peace than do open economies. Of course, given the strong empirical evidence
on the liberal peace espoused by Bruce Russett (2002) and others, this is likely due to the fact that
more open economies are less likely to be engaging in conﬂict anyway. As for the latter ﬁnding,
many of the worlds major oil producing nations are concentrated in high conﬂict areas and are
more likely to be involved in a higher rate of conﬂict – hence peace will bring them greater beneﬁts.
Somewhat ironically, abundant petroleum resources may simply be a mixed blessing for a country.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that a country’s initial level of real GDP does not aﬀect the beneﬁts
from peace – column (II). The empirical results presented in column (V) suggest that a country’s
democratic governance does not directly aﬀect its beneﬁts from peace. Column (VI) of Table 6,
when all these variables are included simultaneously, indicates that the pattern of regional variation
as well as the role of openness and fuel exports, are unchanged.
30Table 6 indicates that Eastern European countries would be willing to give up less consumption growth than the
G7 to live in a state of peace. As mentioned before, however, there may be some anomalies in the coding of conﬂicts
for Eastern Europe − e.g., the USSR in Afghanistan. However, if Eastern Europe is dropped from the sample (not
shown) the regression is virtually unchanged.
20To explore whether a country’s democratic governance aﬀects its beneﬁts from peace in-
directly through its economic conditions, in column (VII) of Table 6 I present estimates where I
include the interaction terms between the economic variables and democracy. A few interesting
ﬁnding emerge from this regression. First, Democratic governments that are more open to trade
have more to gain from peace. Second, non-Democratic fuel exporters also have the most to gain
from peace. Again, these countries are more likely to gain from peace because these types of coun-
tries are more likely to be currently engaged in a higher frequency of welfare reducing conﬂict.
As such, they will have the most to gain from peace. The other estimated coeﬃcients are largely
unaﬀected by the inclusion of these additional variables.
5 Conclusion
Following Lucas (1987), this paper estimates the potential economic gain from peace as the certainty
equivalent of how much individuals would be willing to give up of their current consumption up
in order to live in a peaceful world. Using panel data for 147 countries, I calculate a synthetic
path of consumption that removes the eﬀects of war on the mean and volatility of consumption
growth. From these estimates, the cost of conﬂict are calculated. The main ﬁnding is that a lower
bound estimate of the average beneﬁt from eliminating war is about 8 percent of per capita annual
consumption. In addition, though many of the poorest countries stand to beneﬁt greatly from
peace, the beneﬁts to developed economies can often be substantial (see Figure 1). The results
are robust to regional eﬀects and possible reverse causality of the type considered by Hess and
Orphanides (1995). Further, both data limitations and the nature of this technique suggest that
the calculation represents a lower bound estimate of the possible gain from eliminating conﬂict.
In an attempt to assign an actual dollar value to this lower bound estimate of the cost of
war, at an admitted loss of generality, multiply each country’s calculated cost of conﬂict (τi) by
their actual per-capita and total consumption in 1985 international dollars. By this measure, the
average (world) cost of conﬂict is $72 per person ($142 for countries appearing in Table 4). The
countries whose citizens would be willing to pay the most to avoid conﬂict are Iraq ($1,220), Iran
21Figure 1: Cost of Conﬂict (τ∗

















































Notes: Welfare calculations are obtained using expression (6). All countries for which data are
available are pictured in Figure (1) as all countries may enjoy the global beneﬁts of reduced conﬂict.($719), Qatar ($ 489), Algeria ($467), and Syria ($457). The United States ranks 8th highest at
$353. Recall that these are not one-time payments, but a permanent per-capital payment, so that
the simple present discounted value is twenty-one times higher for a risk free rate of 5 percent.
Similarly, the total world cost of conﬂict in 1985 dollars and for the 1985 population is $399.12
billion, and this permanent payment would grow at the rate of population growth. In 1985 dollars
and population, the United States, China, India, Iran, and Iraq as countries face the highest costs
of conﬂict–$84.5, $66.1, $39.3, $33.4, and $18.7 billion, respectively. The magnitude of the potential
consumption welfare and dollar gains from eliminating conﬂict should make economists, political
scientists, and policy-makers continue to investigate and advocate for domestic and international
institutions to realize such gains.
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25Data Appendix
Omitted Countries and Countries Without Coded Conﬂict
The following countries do not have a coded conﬂict: Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bar-
bados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape
Verde Islands, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dji-
bouti, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, East Germany, West Germany, Grenada, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Poland, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Reunion, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain,
St. Kitts & Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago,
Tunisia, U.S.S.R., United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Western Samoa and Zaire.
The following countries are not considered for lack of data: Bhutan, Dominica, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent & the Grenadines and Tonga.
Economic Data
• Penn World Tables (Summers & Heston)
– ∆log(cit) : Log diﬀerence of real GDP per capita in constant dollars using chain index
(1985 international prices in PWT5) times consumption share of GDP (1985 interna-
tional prices).
– GDPini: initial level of real GDP per capita in constant dollars using chain index (1985
international prices in PWT5).
– OPENini: initial openness measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.
External Conﬂicts
• International Crisis Behavior Project: Actor Level Data Set: Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser
(1997).
– EXTS: Full scale war (SEVVIO = 4).
– Home (H): crisis took place on the crisis actor’s home territory (CRACTLOC = 1).
– Away (A): crisis did not take place on the crisis actor’s home territory (CRACTLOC 6=
1).
• Peace Science Society International: Correlates of War Inter-State War Data, 1816-1997
Correlates of War Extra-State War Data, 1816-1997.
– EXTB: Military conﬂicts between states (inter-state wars) or between state and non-
state actor (extra-state wars).
26– If a conﬂict satisﬁes both EXTB and EXTS, then it is viewed as big (EXTB). Distin-
guishing feature between the two is that EXTB is coded for more than 1,000 annual
deaths.
Internal Conﬂict
• State Failure Task Force: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1954-1996 Data Set,
Gurr and Harﬀ (1997).
– GENOCIDE: Genocide/Politicides with more than 1,000 annual casualties.
– ETHNIC: Ethnic wars with more than 1,000 annual deaths.
– REGIME: Abrupt or disruptive regime changes with signiﬁcant armed violence.
– REVOLT: Revolutionary Wars with more than 1,000 annual deaths.
Global Development Network Growth Database: Social Indicators and Fixed Factors, East-
erly and Sewadeh
• World Bank Group: Global Development Network Growth Database
– EXPFUEL: Major exporter of fuel/oil (greater than 50% of total exports of goods and
services).
– ETHFRAC: Ethnic fractionalization.
– DEMO: Democracy from Gurr and Harﬀ (1997). Equal to 1 if a democracy and zero
otherwise.
27Supplemental Appendix
Im, Pesaran and Shin (1995), hereafter IPS, provide a test for unit roots in heterogenous
panel data sets that allows the alternative hypothesis to have heterogeneity of the autoregressive
term (ρ), in addition to heterogeneity in the intercept and trend coeﬃcients as well as the serial
correlation of the error term in the maintained hypothesis. They demonstrate the beneﬁcial power
and size properties of their test. Below, I demonstrate that conducting the empirical work in growth
rates rather than in levels is suggested by the results from the IPS unit root tests.
The top row of Table A.1 presents the results for the standard IPS unit root test with trend
on the log-level of per-capita consumption. The equation estimated, country by country, is:
∆log(cit) = αi + (ρi − 1) · log(cit−1) +
pi X
j=1
φj · ∆log(cit−j) + θi · t + eit (A.1)
where cit is per-capita consumption in country i at time t. The null hypothesis is that ρi = 1 against
the alternative that ρi < 1. The t-statistic that ρ = 1 for the ith country, denoted ti(ρ = 1), is then
averaged across all N countries, t = N−1 PN
i=1 ti(ρ = 1), and compared to the critical values in
IPS. The estimated value of ˆ t = −1.78 reported in the top row of Table A.1 is considerably smaller
in absolute value than the 10 percent critical value of approximately −2.28. Hence, I cannot reject
the null hypothesis of a unit root at even the .1 critical level.A.1
I also consider two standard modiﬁcations to the IPS unit root test in order to gauge the
robustness of the ﬁndings. First, subtract each country’s ﬁrst observation from the entire series
and avoid estimating the ﬁxed eﬀects. This has been shown to lessen the bias problem pointed out
in Nickel (1981) in OLS estimates of the autoregressive term in a panel data AR model with ﬁxed
eﬀects. Second, dependence of shocks across countries can be controlled for, albeit imperfectly, by
also subtracting out cross country time averages from each country’s observation.A.2 Combinations
of these two modiﬁcations are presented in the remaining rows of Table A.1. Importantly, however,
these changes in speciﬁcation do not aﬀect the result that the evidence supports the view that I
should model the eﬀect of shocks to consumption in growth rates rather than in levels.
IPS do make the caveat, however, that given the heterogeneity of the panel data, I cannot
infer that a unit root can be rejected for all countries. To better gauge the inability to reject a unit
root, note that the univariate Dickey-Fuller t-statistic for rejecting a unit root at the .10 level is
−3.18 for the case of a constant and trend with 50 observations. However, in all cases, less than 10
percent of the countries have individual t-statistics on ρ = 1, ti(ρ = 1), that are less than −3.18.
Again, this provides further support for the empirical speciﬁcation that shocks to consumption are
best modelled in growth rates rather than in log-levels.
A.1The reported estimates are obtained two lags of consumption growth as explanatory variables. IPS recommend a
generous lag length to insure that their test perform well in the presence of serially correlated errors. Increasing the
lag length to four, which is quite generous given that there are at most 34 observations per country, actually lowers
the estimate of does t, which strengthens the results.
A.2A simple solution for how to control for more general types of dependence has remained illusive. For instance,
adopting a SUR estimation procedure to estimate the error dependence across countries, in fact, re-imposes the
homogeneity of the persistence term as well as runs into practical issues of how one deals with unbalanced panels.
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Table A.1: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002) Panel Unit Root Test, t
Fixed Scaled by Remove Time Is t’s p-value Fraction of
Eﬀect ci0 Averages t ≤ .10 ti(ρ = 1) < −3.18
Yes No No -1.78 No .08
No Yes No -0.93 No .02
Yes No Yes -1.87 No .07
No Yes Yes -1.23 No .04
Notes: Regressions include all 147 countries for which data are available. I include two lags of
consumption growth on the right hand side and a time trend in all cases, and a constant except
where noted that I scaled the data by its initial value ci0. Fraction of ti(ρ = 1) < −3.18 is the
fraction of individual countries ˆ ti(ρ = 1)0s that are less than the univariate .10 critical value of
−3.18.
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